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How Algorithms Interact: Goffman’s ‘Interaction Order’ in Automated Trading 
Abstract 
In a talk in 2013, Karin Knorr Cetina referred to ‘the interaction order of algorithms’, a 
phrase that implicitly invokes Erving Goffman’s ‘interaction order’. This paper explores 
the application of the latter notion to the interaction of automated-trading algorithms, 
viewing algorithms as material entities (programs running on physical machines) and 
conceiving of the interaction order of algorithms as the ensemble of their effects on each 
other. The paper identifies the main way in which trading algorithms interact (via 
electronic ‘order books’, which algorithms both ‘observe’ and populate) and focuses on 
two particularly Goffmanesque aspects of algorithmic interaction: queuing and 
‘spoofing’, or deliberate deception. Following Goffman’s injunction not to ignore the 
influence on interaction of matters external to it, the paper examines some prominent 
such matters. Empirically, the paper draws on documentary analysis and 185 interviews 
conducted by the author with high-frequency traders and others involved in automated 
trading. 
Key Words 
Interaction order; Erving Goffman; Karin Knorr Cetina; algorithm; high-frequency 
trading; queuing; spoofing. 
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‘[H]uman awareness comprises the tip of a huge pyramid of data flows, most of 
which occur between machines’ (Hayles, 2006: 165). 
As Hayles points out, human beings are increasingly enmeshed in a ‘cognisphere’, 
shared with machines, in which many important processes take place among those 
machines, without direct human involvement. How should what Beer (2009: 987) calls 
‘the technological challenges to human agency offered by the decision-making powers of 
established and emergent software algorithms’ be theorised? This paper addresses this 
question for one specific area: automated financial trading, especially high-frequency 
trading or HFT, which is ultrafast and involves very large numbers of trades. 
The paper takes up a suggestion made by Karin Knorr Cetina in a talk to the panel 
‘Theorizing Numbers’ at the American Sociological Association, in which she used the 
evocative phrase: ‘the interaction order of algorithms’ (Knorr Cetina, 2013). It points us 
in a somewhat different direction to much recent work on algorithms, which draws 
upon theorists as sophisticated and well-known as Hayles herself (e.g. 1999, 2012; see 
also Gane, Venn and Hand, 2007), Foucault (e.g. Cheney-Lippold, 2011 and Bucher, 
2012), Deleuze (e.g. 1992: see e.g., Savat and Poster, 2005 and Cheney-Lippold, 2011), 
Latour (e.g. 2005) and Lash (2002, 2007; see Beer, 2009).  
The term, ‘the interaction order’, was coined by Erving Goffman, whose primary 
reputation is not as a theorist – even a critic as sympathetic as Burns (1992) could find 
his theorising unsystematic and sometimes even careless – but as a hugely insightful 
observer of social interaction. ‘The Interaction Order’ was the title of Goffman’s 
intended 1982 Presidential Address to the American Sociological Association, 
undelivered because he was already suffering from the cancer that was soon to kill him, 
but published the following year (Goffman, 1983). In it, he laid out what he saw as most 
central to his life’s work:  
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Social interaction can be identified narrowly as that which uniquely transpires in 
social situations, that is, environments in which two or more individuals are 
physically in one another’s response presence. (Presumably the telephone and the 
mails provide reduced versions of the primordial real thing.) … My concern over 
the years has been to promote acceptance of this face-to-face domain as an 
analytically viable one – a domain which might be titled, for want of any happy 
name, the interaction order (Goffman, 1983: p. 2, emphasis in original). 
 The uneasy parenthesis in that quotation points to the need to question the 
primary role of physical co-presence in Goffman’s conception of the interaction order. In 
the decades since 1983, ‘the telephone and the mails’ have been joined by multiple other 
forms of mediated communication: electronic mail, text messages and other forms of 
instant messaging, social media, Skype and other forms of telepresence, etc. As these 
have grown in importance, Knorr Cetina is surely right to suggest supplementing 
Goffman’s focus on spatial proximity with a broader, temporal notion of ‘response 
presence’ as accountability ‘for responding without inappropriate delay to an incoming 
attention or interaction request’ (Knorr Cetina, 2009: 74).  
Given this paper’s focus on algorithmic trading, it is particularly relevant that 
both Knorr Cetina herself and Alex Preda have productively deployed reworked 
versions of Goffman’s ‘interaction order’ to analyse human beings trading electronically. 
Much of Knorr Cetina’s research on financial markets has concerned foreign-exchange 
dealers in bank trading rooms communicating with other traders (in different banks, 
but personally identifiable and sometimes personally known) via the Reuters 
‘conversational dealing’ system, an early electronic system ‒ still in use today ‒ that 
combines automated requests for price quotations with the capacity to formulate Telex-
style messages conveying up-to-date market information, pleasantries (‘please’, 
‘thanks’), and the details needed to settle trades (see, especially, Knorr Cetina and 
 4 
Bruegger, 2002a). However, Knorr Cetina also examines human traders interacting with 
a fully anonymous electronic market (e.g. Knorr Cetina, 2009: 72-73), as does Preda 
(2009 and 2013). In the work of Knorr Cetina and Preda, Goffman’s notion of the 
interaction order gets stretched beyond temporal response presence among spatially 
separate but identifiable humans, as ‘the market’ itself becomes a party to ‘postsocial’ 
interaction (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, 2002b). As Knorr Cetina points out, in 
projecting ‘the market’, traders’ computer screens project ‘an “other” for participants, 
with whom these participants interact’ (Knorr Cetina, 2009: 73; see also Knorr Cetina 
and Preda, 2007). Preda discovers human traders – no longer in trading rooms, but 
often physically entirely alone – trying to disaggregate ‘the market’ into different kinds 
of agent (for example, ‘an individual [human] trader, an institution, or a robot’: i.e., a 
trading algorithm) that do different things, and sometimes (even though alone) audibly 
addressing these absent, imagined, unhearing others, ‘engaging with “guys”, “dudes”, 
and “buds”’ (Preda, 2013: 42; Preda, 2009: 687). 
Knorr Cetina’s invocation of ‘the interaction order of algorithms’ invites us to 
take yet a further step, which is this paper’s focus: to extend the notion of ‘interaction 
order’ to situations in which trading algorithms interact with each other rather than 
with human beings. First, though, we need to be clear what ‘algorithm’ means in this 
context, and what it might mean for algorithms to interact. I follow how my 
interviewees use the term ‘algorithm’. For them, algorithms are not simply the abstract 
‘effective procedures’ (finite sets of exact, ‘mechanical’ instructions) of 
metamathematics or computer science. Rather, an ‘algorithm’ is a material 
implementation of such a procedure: i.e., a computer program running on a physical 
machine.  
Although this view of algorithms is implicit in much of the literature pointed to 
above – for example, in Lash’s discussion of ‘[p]ower through the algorithm’ (2007: 71) 
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– it is worth spelling out explicitly that an algorithm is a material entity that does things 
materially: ultimately, electrically. (The need for speed in automated trading means that 
there is a sense in which those involved in it have to be materialists. For example, they 
cannot successfully conceive of computers as abstract machines, but have to think of 
them as assemblages of metal, plastic and silicon through which electrical signals pass: 
see MacKenzie [2014a]. This points to the relevance here of theoretical traditions in 
which materiality is prominent, such as ‘media materialism’ [e.g., Kittler, 2006; Parikka, 
2015].) Among the things an algorithm does, in automated trading, is to have material 
effects on the behaviour of other algorithms; reciprocally, their behaviour influences 
what it does. The ensemble of such effects is what I mean by the ‘interaction order of 
algorithms’.  
Goffman was a thorough-going, albeit tacit, materialist. Human bodies, their 
positioning, their physical settings, their gestures, glances, blushes, etc, are prominent in 
his work: see, e.g., Goffman (1959, 1963, 1967 and 1968). The reader’s intuitions may, 
however, rebel against the application of Goffman’s ‘interaction order’ to the mutual 
effects of algorithms. Their ‘silicon bodies’ differ radically from human flesh, and they 
interact explicitly and instrumentally, not subtly and expressively as humans do. And, of 
course, as far as we know, trading algorithms have no self-consciousness, while humans 
are often painfully self-aware.  
 Intuitions nevertheless need to be interrogated. The success with which Knorr 
Cetina and Preda have applied their extended conceptualisations of the ‘interaction 
order’ to human beings trading electronically and anonymously suggests that we should 
not reject a priori the notion’s application to trading by algorithms. After all, the 
information and forms of action available to human beings in most of today’s 
anonymous electronic markets are often no different from those available to algorithms. 
Both humans and algorithms face much the same tasks (especially the task of drawing 
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inferences from the ‘order books’ described in this paper’s second section) and they act 
in the same way, by entering, cancelling, or sometimes modifying orders, even if they do 
it with different tools: humans using visual interfaces, keyboard and mouse; algorithms 
employing direct, computer-to-computer communication.  
This paper therefore asks the reader to suspend intuitive judgement while it 
follows Knorr Cetina’s pointer and experiments with applying Goffman’s ‘interaction 
order’ to automated trading. The empirical material drawn on is research by the author 
on automated trading (especially on high-frequency trading, but also, for example, on 
the ‘execution algorithms’ used by institutional investors to split up big orders), on the 
exchanges and other trading venues on which it takes place, and on its technological 
underpinnings. In total, 185 interviews have been conducted, mainly in Chicago and 
New York, with the developers of trading algorithms, the traders who use them (who 
are often the same people), exchange staff, providers of technological services, 
regulators, etc. These interviews (which covered both the current practices of 
automated trading but also ‒ when the interviewee had had a long enough career to 
have first-hand experience of this ‒ the historical processes that have shaped current 
practices) have been supplemented by participant observation at two industry 
meetings, a visit to Cermak (a data centre in Chicago that houses much algorithmic 
trading), and examination of web-based discussion forums, of the technical literature, of 
trade press, of enforcement actions by regulators, etc. 
Five sections follow this introduction. The first sets the stage by drawing on this 
empirical research to describe the physical settings within which trading algorithms 
interact and to identify the most important way in which they do so. Next comes a 
section on a form of interaction discussed in Goffman’s Presidential Address (and also 
prominent in ethnomethodological analyses such as Livingstone, 1987) that is of huge 
importance in automated trading: queuing. Then follows a discussion of one of 
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Goffman’s most persistent concerns: dissimulation, including a form of it particularly 
salient for automated trading, ‘spoofing’. That section includes a discussion of a 
fascinating episode in which algorithmic action at odds with ‘normal’ behaviour in 
queues has formed the basis of an accusation of spoofing. The paper’s penultimate 
section takes up Goffman’s reminder not to neglect ‘the dependency of interactional 
activity on matters outside the interaction’ (Goffman, 1983: 12) by examining some of 
the most important of those matters as they bear upon algorithmic trading. The paper’s 
conclusion is, I hope, appropriately modest: it argues that Goffman’s ‘interaction order’ 
points us in the right direction when studying trading algorithms, but it also identifies 
the methodological difficulty of research on how trading algorithms interact. 
How Trading Algorithms Interact 
As already emphasised, this paper views trading algorithms materially, as programs 
running on trading firms’ computer servers. Many, perhaps most, of those servers are to 
be found in no more than fifteen computer data centres worldwide, in each of which 
thousands of trading algorithms may be running at any one time. Some of these centres 
are owned by exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange; others are multi-user 
buildings, such as Chicago’s Cermak, NY4 in Secaucus, New Jersey, and LD4 in Slough. 
Cermak used to be a giant printworks (the Sears Roebuck catalogue was printed there: 
see MacKenzie, 2014b), but most other trading datacentres are purpose-built, and easy 
to mistake for warehouses. They contain few human beings, mainly security and 
maintenance personnel. Huge amounts of energy flow into datacentres in the form of 
electricity, and flow out as heat extracted by powerful cooling systems (tens of 
thousands of computer servers packed close together generate a lot of heat). Those 
servers are housed on racks in rows of cages: normally wire-mesh, but sometimes with 
opaque doors for privacy. Above the cages is a giant spider’s web of copper and fibre-
optic cables that connects servers to each other (and carries fibre-optic, microwave and 
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satellite signals from the outside world). Some of the cages contain the servers and 
switches that make up the computer systems of exchanges and other organised trading 
venues; other cages contain the servers of the firms trading on those exchanges. The 
reason for the clustering into a remarkably small number of very big buildings is trading 
firms’ desire to have their servers ‘co-located’: placed as close as possible to exchanges’ 
systems.  
With limited exceptions, the trading algorithms running on these servers do not 
interact directly with each other, but indirectly, most commonly via an exchange’s 
computer system, and in particular via an electronic file called the exchange’s ‘central 
limit-order book’, or more simply, its ‘order book’. (To avoid cluttering the text, I have 
gathered together the main exceptions to its empirical generalisations in Appendix 1.) A 
pictorial representation of a typical – but hypothetical, because I want to use it to 
illustrate a variety of points as clearly as possible – order book is in Figure 1. It is an 
order book for shares, but (with exceptions briefly described in Appendix 1) the trading 
of futures, foreign exchange, U.S. Treasury bonds and stock options is similar in form. On 
the left-hand side of Figure 1 are the bids to buy the shares in question: for example, 
there is a bid to buy 100 shares at $44.99; a bid to buy 44 shares, also at $44.99, etc. On 
the right-hand side are the offers to sell, for example an offer to sell 100 shares at 
$45.00.  
No human traders are to be found in datacentres such as Cermak: humans are in 
that sense on the periphery of today’s trading. A trading algorithm that is housed in a 
datacentre enters bids or offers into the order book (or cancels, or sometimes modifies, 
bids or offers it has previously entered) by instructing the network interface card of the 
computer server on which it is running to send an electronic message through the cable 
– typically of the order of 100 metres long – that threads its way through the spider’s 
web and connects the server to the exchange’s computer system. That system contains 
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programs called ‘matching engines’, which process these incoming messages and update 
the order books for the shares or other financial instruments being traded. If a matching 
engine finds a ‘match’ (a bid to buy a financial instrument, and an offer to sell it, both at 
the same price) it executes a trade; otherwise, it simply adds new bids and offers to the 
order book.  
As well as trading algorithms sending in the bids and offers that populate the 
order book, they also ‘observe’ it (my term, not interviewees’). Whenever a matching 
engine receives a new order or a cancellation or modification of an existing order, or it 
finds a match, it sends the exchange’s feed server a message containing the anonymised 
details. That server then disseminates these messages to subscribers to the exchange’s 
datafeed. (The ‘hidden orders’ mentioned in Appendix 2 are, however, not 
disseminated.) The datafeed flows – again through around 100 metres of fibre-optic 
cable – to trading firms’ servers, which use the stream of messages to construct their 
own electronic ‘mirrors’ of the order book.  
Trading algorithms interrogate this mirrored order book in a variety of ways, 
seeking to predict price changes. In the order book in Figure 1, for example, there are 
offers to sell 4,240 shares, and bids to buy 1,324; ‘supply’ thus exceeds ‘demand’, and 
thus a fall in price might be predicted. While no sophisticated trading algorithm would 
rely on a calculation as simplistic as this, interviewees reported heavy reliance by 
algorithms on various forms of weighted average of the numbers of financial 
instruments being bid for and offered at different prices, along with a variety of ways of 
inferring the dynamics of how the order book is changing through time. The pervasive 
concern, discussed below, with ‘spoofing’ means that sophisticated trading algorithms 
will also deploy various means of assessing the likelihood that the existing bids and 
offers in the order book will actually be cancelled before they are executed, and will 
discount those for which this is the case.  
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Predictions based on these algorithmic ‘observations’ of the order book (along 
with similar observations of the order books for other instruments whose prices are 
known to be correlated with those of the instrument being traded) are used for two 
main forms of profit-seeking trading. The conceptually simpler is ‘liquidity-taking’ or 
‘aggressive’ trading. Suppose an algorithm’s observations generate the inference that 
the price of the shares being traded via the order book in Figure 1 is about to fall. It 
could then send to the matching engine an order to sell shares at $44.99, which the 
matching engine can execute at least in part as soon as it has processed it, because it can 
match it with existing bids to buy at $44.99. (That is why it would be called a ‘liquidity-
taking’ order: it removes an existing order or orders from the order book.) If the price 
does indeed fall below $44.99, then the algorithm can buy back shares at a profit.  
Liquidity-making, in contrast, involves an algorithm sending the matching 
engine orders that cannot immediately be executed, and its most systematic form 
(known as ‘market-making’) involves continually keeping both a bid and a higher-priced 
offer in the order book, in the hope that both will be executed and the difference in their 
prices captured as profit. Suppose, for example, that in Figure 1 the same algorithm has 
entered into the order book both the bid to buy 100 shares at $44.99 and the offer to sell 
100 shares at $45.00. If both are executed, the algorithm will make a profit of one cent 
for each share traded. That sounds negligible, but high-frequency trading involves the 
buying and selling of huge numbers of shares, so tiny profits add up. 
 A market-making algorithm has just as much need as a liquidity-taking 
algorithm electronically to ‘observe’ the contents of the order book and thus to predict 
price movements, because if prices move sharply it can easily be left with an inventory 
of shares the prices of which have fallen, or with what participants call a ‘short position’ 
in shares whose prices have risen.1 The constant observation of the order book by 
                                                             
1 That is to say, it may have sold shares that its firm does not own. 
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trading algorithms of all kinds, and the actions they frequently take in response to that 
observation, mean that an explicit ‘global’ electronic representation – a representation 
of the entirety of ‘the market’ in question – plays a much larger role than in most 
ordinary human social interaction. (At a party, for example, most participants’ attention 
is devoted to a small subset of what is going on, with only an anxious host or hostess 
maybe monitoring the event as a whole: see, e.g., Goffman 1963.)  
As Yuval Millo pointed out to me in a personal communication, the crucial role of 
a global representation in algorithmic trading suggests the need for nuance, when 
analysing it, in invoking metaphors – such as ‘swarms’ (see Vehlken, 2013) – in which 
there is self-organisation resulting from local interactions, for example between nearest 
neighbours. (There are some local interactions among trading algorithms: see Appendix 
1.) Again, though, the central role of a global representation is fully consistent with 
Knorr Cetina’s and Preda’s extensions of Goffman’s ‘interaction order’. The human 
traders they studied also devote much or sometimes even all of their attention to a 
global representation on screen of the overall market, a representation that today is 
usually simply a computer file presented in a form (such as Figure 1) suited to human 
eyes. Like algorithms, those human traders also simultaneously observe and construct 
the object of their attention. 
Queuing  
After sketching overall features of the human interaction order, Goffman (1983: 6) went 
on ‘to try to identify the basic substantive units, the recurrent structures and their 
attendant processes’ asking ‘[w]hat sort of animals are to be found in the interactional 
zoo?’ Among his first examples was the queue: ‘[w]hat queues protect is ordinal position 
determined “locally” by first come first placed’ (Goffman 1983: 16). 
 That ordering is precisely the one enforced by most matching engines (for the 
main exceptions, see Appendix 1). For example, the offer to sell 50 shares at $45.00 in 
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Figure 1 will be executed only once the earlier offer to sell 100 is executed or cancelled. 
It is natural to conceptualise this ordering as a ‘queue’, and that is how participants do 
indeed think of it. Queues are of huge importance in automated trading; Pardo-Guerra 
(forthcoming) summarises the field’s history as ‘from [trading-floor] crowds to queues’. 
As those of my interviewees who had traded manually in Chicago’s trading pits 
reported, an ordering similar to the start of a queue did often emerge in those crowds. 
In a pit, bids and offers were either shouted out or hand-signalled, and were thus 
observable to the traders crowded into the pit. While a variety of factors – including 
informal ‘sharing’ norms and reciprocity – affected who got which trade, there was often 
agreement as to which trader had, for example, made the first bid at a given price, and 
an informal convention that s/he then deserved to have that bid executed first. This 
limited form of ordering was, in classically ethnomethodological fashion, ‘reflexive, self-
organizing, organized entirely in situ, locally’ (Livingston, 1987: 10). In automated 
trading, however, queues are not simply self-organised: they are structured 
electronically by exchanges’ matching engines. 
Queue position is not a pressing concern for ‘aggressive’ algorithms (liquidity-
taking orders don’t usually encounter queues), but it matters enormously to market-
making algorithms’ liquidity-making orders. If these orders are too far back in the 
queue, they may simply never be executed, and so no profit will ever be made. Getting to 
the front of the queue is a matter of technical expertise (such as the ‘close-to-the-metal’ 
programming, as participants call it, needed to speed processing by a computer as a 
physical machine) and of spatial location. Queue position is one chief reason why 
trading firms pay exchanges to co-locate their servers alongside the exchange’s 
computer system. Speed, and therefore queue position, can, however, also be achieved 
more informally. Before the electronic messages containing orders reach the matching 
engine, they are processed by order gateways. These are normally identical computer 
servers, running identical software, and identically linked to the matching engine. 
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However, each gateway typically serves more than one trading firm, and if a firm has to 
share a gateway with a firm whose algorithms send in large numbers of orders, the 
former’s algorithms’ orders may be delayed. Avoiding this can be a major practical 
issue; it is, for example, helpful (I was told by a former high-frequency trader) to know 
exactly whom to speak to at the exchange should it happen. ‘If you didn’t know to call 
that person, you’ll start at some low-level help-centre desk’.  
There are also other subtleties to algorithmic queueing, which go beyond the 
need for speed, and which are sometimes deeply controversial among insiders to the 
world of automated trading. As both Goffman and ethnomethodologists such as 
Livingston (1987) emphasised, the interaction order of human queues is a moral order: 
first come first served ‘produces a temporal ordering that totally blocks the influence of 
such differential social statuses and relationships as the candidates bring with them to 
the service situation’ (Goffman, 1983: 14). Especially in US share trading, a variety of 
types of bids and offers are available to some algorithms (but not always to others), 
which can be used to help an algorithm get to the front of the queue: see Appendix 2. 
These bids and offers have generated much controversy (both among my interviewees 
and also in public forums: see, e.g Bodek 2013). The accusation against them has in 
effect been that they allow ‘differential social statuses and relationships’ illegitimately to 
influence queue position. 
Dissimulation  
As noted, one of Goffman’s persistent interests was the role of dissimulation in 
interaction. He was, of course, no naive moralist, and fully understood that presenting a 
false impression is sometimes entirely appropriate (it is, for instance, right for a medical 
student who is nervous to hide that fact when treating a patient) and that ‘tact’ ‒ for 
instance, pretending not to notice an occurrence that would cause a participant to lose 
‘face’ ‒ is often desirable. 
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 Algorithms, too, dissimulate. Consider the excess of offers to sell in the order 
book in Figure 1. Much of it is made up of three large offers (for 1000, 400 and 700 
shares) with prices that are at least two ‘levels’ away from the best offer price of $45.00. 
Under normal circumstances, the algorithm (or, perhaps, even human being) that has 
posted those offers will have the time to cancel them before they are executed. So 
maybe they have been entered into the order book so as to produce an excess of offers 
relative to bids, and thus cause other algorithms to predict a price fall and therefore to 
sell. The original algorithm can then profit from the price decline it has caused, for 
example by buying at a temporarily low price, cancelling the large offers, and selling 
when prices recover? 
 For an algorithm or human to do that is what market participants call ‘spoofing’. 
It is, for example, what the west London trader, Navinder Singh Sarao, who was arrested 
in April 2015, is accused of by the US Department of Justice. Its indictment quotes emails 
allegedly sent by Mr Sarao in which he requested technical help adding a particular 
feature to his trading software, ‘a cancel if close function, so that an order is cancelled if 
the market gets close’, with a further refinement to permit him ‘to be able to alternate 
the closeness ie one price away or three prices away etc etc’ (US Department of Justice, 
2015: 7-8; in Figure 1, an offer to sell at $45.01 is ‘one price away’ from the best offer).  
 Given that spoofing is illegitimate and generally now illegal (see below), it is 
unsurprising that none of my interviewees admitted to writing algorithms that spoofed. 
They did, however, talk about how important it was for any algorithm that made price 
predictions on the basis of an analysis of the order book to be able to distinguish ‘real’ 
orders in that book from ‘spoof’ orders that would be cancelled before being executed. 
One of them had, for example, programmed his firm’s algorithms to give less weight to a 
single big order than to multiple small orders of the same aggregate size, because the 
former was less likely to be ‘real’. Both he and another interviewee were experimenting 
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with artificial-intelligence machine learning techniques – especially ‘support vector 
machine’ techniques – to make their algorithms more sophisticated in how they 
distinguished ‘real’ from ‘spoof’ orders. (One of the surprises of the interviews with the 
designers of high-frequency trading algorithms is the otherwise rather limited use of 
artificial-intelligence techniques in price prediction. HFT algorithms, especially market-
making algorithms that have to get to the heads of queues, often employ conceptually 
very simple but ultrafast inferences, such as ‘weighted’ counts of bids and offers or 
extrapolation to the stock market of movements in the market for stock-index futures. 
Liquidity-taking algorithms, which can afford to act a little more slowly, do employ more 
sophisticated inferences, but interviewees at firms that specialised in these algorithms 
reported that the patterns in order-book dynamics they exploited were often at the 
border of statistical significance, and the low signal:noise ratio caused difficulties for 
machine-learning techniques.) 
 What is, from the viewpoint of this paper, a particularly interesting set of 
instances of alleged spoofing was described to me by an interviewee in June 2015. (It 
may also be a consequential set. Previous allegations of spoofing have involved either 
individuals such as Sarao or firms marginal to automated trading. The alleged spoofing 
in these instances is reported to be by a mainstream HFT business. However, no official 
ruling has yet been made on whether the accusation is valid.) In all the previous 
examples of spoofing I had encountered, the alleged ‘fake’ orders were placed not at the 
best bid or offer, but one or more levels away from it. The new set concerns orders at 
the best bid or offer price, such as the offer to sell 600 shares at $45.00 in Figure 1.  
 For an algorithm to place a fake order at the best bid or offer price is potentially 
an effective means of moving a market, because algorithms that make inferences based 
on counts of the contents of the order book typically (so interviewees told me) ‘weight’ 
these orders more heavily than orders further away, partly because those latter orders 
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have traditionally been more likely to be fake. (An algorithm summing the offers in 
Figure 1 might assign a weight of 1.0 to the offers at $45.00; a weight of 0.5 to offers at 
$45.01; 0.25 to offers at $45.02; etc.) However, a fake order at the best bid or offer price 
is also dangerous to the intended spoofer, because it is much more likely to be executed 
before it is cancelled (it would be particularly dangerous for a slow human being rather 
than a fast algorithm to attempt to spoof in this fashion).  
 What first led my interviewee’s firm to suspect spoofing was behaviour at odds 
with the normal interaction order of queuing. It involved use of the ‘modify up’ 
instruction of Globex (the electronic trading system of the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange), which alters an existing bid or offer by increasing the number of futures 
contracts being bid for or offered. If this instruction is employed, the order that has been 
modified goes the back of the queue (as in the case of the offer of 600 shares at $45.00 in 
Figure 1). ‘You should never do that in a FIFO market’, said my interviewee. (FIFO is the 
acronym of ‘first in, first out’, and refers to the form of queuing discussed in this paper, 
in which the first order at a given price received by the matching engine is executed 
first.)2 Doing something that caused an order to lose queue position ‘looked weird to us’, 
the interviewee reported. One interpretation might have been that this was 
‘incompetent’ or ‘maladjusted’ (Livingston, 1987: 14) queuing behaviour, but my 
interviewee’s firm took it to be evidence of spoofing.  By using ‘modify up’, if necessary 
repeatedly, an order could be kept at the back of the queue, which is of course exactly 
what an algorithm that is spoofing needs to do to reduce the risk of the order being 
executed. 
 Fascinating as spoofing is, it does not exhaust the possibilities of algorithmic 
dissimulation. Execution algorithms are, as noted above, used by institutional investors 
                                                             
2 His implicit contrast is with the ‘pro rata’ markets mentioned in Appendix 1, in which 
‘modify up’ can be employed without detrimental effects. 
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to split up large orders; along with high-frequency trading, they are the other most 
important form of algorithmic trading. Their entire rationale is as a form of 
dissimulation: the goal is for as long as possible to hide the fact that a big ‘parent’ order 
(perhaps for a million or more shares) is being executed, by splitting it into ‘child’ 
orders for as few as 100 shares. As an interviewee who headed a major enterprise 
providing execution algorithms put it:  
we’ll take that huge order and chop it up into little tiny pieces, and if we do it 
right anyone who’s looking at it can’t tell that there is a big buyer: it looks like 
tiny little retailish trades [the sort of trades a lay investor might engage in] … My 
job is trying to obscure what my institutional clients are trying to do, you know, 
so our role in the market place is to make it so no-one can work out what the 
hell’s going on.  
Unlike spoofing, this form of dissimulation is not merely legal but viewed as entirely 
legitimate. Indeed, the most common form of moral framing in debate over high-
frequency trading (see, e.g., Lewis 2014) is to distinguish the ‘good’ algorithms and 
technical systems that hide big orders from the ‘bad’ HFT algorithms that seek to detect 
the big parent order and change their pricing and order submission behaviour 
appropriately.  That framing, however, is contingent and contestible. Thus, one 
interviewee, exasperated with what he took to be its facile moralism, reversed it: ‘I don’t 
think the guy who’s trying to hide the supply-demand imbalance [by employing an 
execution algorithm], why is he any better of a human being than the person trying to 
discover what the true supply-de[mand imbalance is]?’ 
‘[T]he dependency of interactional activity on matters outside the interaction’ 
For Goffman, interactions have their own logics and processes, and interaction is ‘a 
particular kind of activity’, which is what warrants speaking of ‘the interaction order’ 
just as one might refer to ‘the economic order’ (Goffman, 1983: 5). Goffman, however, 
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also rejected what he called ‘a rampant situationalism’ (1983: 4). He emphasised 
repeatedly that, in words already quoted above, what goes on in interaction depends ‘on 
matters outside the interaction’, including social relationships and social structure. 
Although his discussion of how situations and structures interrelate is not as fully 
developed as one might wish (see Burns, 1992), the broad outlines of Goffman’s account 
are clear. There is only a ‘loose-coupling’ relationship (Goffman, 1983: 12) between 
situations and social structure, but the latter is a real phenomenon, not reducible to an 
aggregate of multiple interactions. Social relationships and social structure shape 
interactions, but not deterministically: for example, the theoretical interest for Goffman 
of the queue is (as indicated above) precisely that it is a form of interaction in which 
their influence is, locally, blocked.  
 Let me, therefore, follow Goffman and give three examples of the ‘loose-
coupling’ shaping of algorithmic interaction by ‘matters outside’ it. The first is the 
changing status of spoofing. When I began interviewing in 2010, spoofing seemed a 
routine market practice, at least in futures trading: ‘most new orders [in the futures 
market] are fake’, a trader in Chicago told me in 2014. There was a long tradition of 
spoofing being acceptable – in Chicago’s trading pits, I was told by another interviewee, 
a successful spoofer was even admired, much as a skilled bluffer in poker would be – 
and a tolerant attitude continued in the early years of the transition to electronic trading 
(Zaloom, 2006; Arnoldi, 2015). Recently, however, disapproval has grown sharply, even 
though two of the more libertarian-minded of my interviewees still felt strongly that it 
was quite wrong for the state to try to take action against spoofing. Until 2014, traders 
who had engaged in spoofing had only ever been subject to administrative action, and 
the resultant fines could in effect be considered a business expense. However, section 
747 of the Dodd-Frank Act (the main post-crisis legislation in the US) weakened the 
legal tests that have to be passed for a criminal prosecution for spoofing to succeed, and 
in October 2014 the first such prosecution began. The trader who told me about the 
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extent of fake orders also reported that in the three weeks since the indictment, the 
incidence of spoofing, as detected by his firm’s algorithms, had gone down sharply.  
The second example concerns the shaping of queueing in US share trading by 
Federal regulation. As summarised in Appendix 2, US stock exchanges are not free to 
have their matching engines structure queues as they wish. Instead, matching-engine 
behaviour is governed by Regulation NMS [National Market System], which, although 
first implemented only in 2007, has roots that can be traced back to the late 1970s 
(Pardo-Guerra forthcoming). Back then, the Securities and Exchange Commission – long 
suspicious of the dominance of one exchange, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) – 
sought, with a mandate from Congress, to create a National Market System that would 
promote competition without leading to market fragmentation. Two designs for that 
system contended. One, backed by prominent economists, was for a single, national 
electronic order book to which all brokers and exchanges would send their orders. 
Unsurprisingly, the NYSE and most of the more minor exchanges saw this proposal as a 
threat to their existence, and successfully promoted an alternative model in which they 
would continue to operate much as they did, but linked by a computer network that 
could be built quickly and easily using existing NYSE technology. Forty years on, that 
remains the basic structure of US share trading. The different exchanges are still not 
fused into a single order book. Instead, Regulation NMS’s elaborate rules are still seen as 
necessary to competition. 
 It is difficult to read this history without thinking of the prescient analysis of 
neoliberalism in Foucault’s lectures on ‘The Birth of Biopolitics’, delivered (as it 
happens) in 1979, just as the crucial decisions were being taken as to how to create 
more ‘competition’ in US share trading. Competition is not a natural condition, the 
Ordoliberals believed: rather, it has to be ‘produced by an active governmentality’ 
(Foucault, 2008: 121). Although the influences on it have been more diffuse, the 
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Securities and Exchange Commission has been the chief vehicle of that governmentality 
in US financial markets, and by constraining how matching engines organise queues it 
has significantly shaped the interaction order of algorithms.  
 My third example is a domain of automated trading in which there has been no 
analogue of that project of governmentality: foreign exchange. (Financial regulations are 
still largely primarily national in scope, while foreign exchange is intrinsically an 
international activity that therefore falls into a gap in regulatory coverage.) In foreign 
exchange, the traditionally dominant actors – the big global commercial banks – have 
retained, at least until very recently, a degree of market power that banks have largely 
lost in other exchange-based trading. However, weighed down by old ‘legacy’ software 
systems, and frequently bureaucratic, big banks are often not good at the development 
of the fast, sophisticated algorithms needed for HFT. When high-frequency trading of 
foreign exchange began, the algorithms deployed by small HFT firms therefore found 
plentiful opportunities for profitable aggressive trading, often at the expense of banks’ 
slower systems. Banks, however, have been able to exert influence on trading venues 
that has had the effect of shutting off many of those opportunities and thus rendering 
liquidity-taking unprofitable. They have, for example, demanded (often successfully) 
that their market-making algorithms be granted privileged ‘last look’ status: in other 
words, matching engines grant their algorithms a time window – which can be as long 
as a second, which is an eternity in HFT – in which to decide whether to permit the 
matching engine to consummate a trade. Last look and other measures to constrain 
liquidity-taking by HFT algorithms have shifted the ecology of algorithms in foreign 
exchange: interviewees reported a wholesale shift from liquidity-taking to liquidity-
making algorithms. 
 
Conclusion 
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Let me be clear what this paper is not arguing. It is not claiming that humans and 
algorithms are identical beings: plainly they are not. Even in the brief narratives 
presented above, their different roles are clear. It is human beings, not algorithms, that 
are angered by perceived queue jumping. It is humans, not algorithms, that are 
prosecuted for spoofing, and the traditional legal test – weakened by the Dodd-Frank 
Act, but likely still to be prominent in the coming trials – is human intent: did Mr Sarao, 
for example, intend to manipulate the market? 
 Nevertheless, the previous sections of this paper have, I hope, shown that the 
limited forms of action available to trading algorithms (to submit orders, to cancel them, 
and sometimes to modify them) can nonetheless give rise to rich forms of strategic 
interaction. Algorithms use whatever means are made available to them to get to the 
front of the electronic queue; they dissimulate (sometimes legitimately, sometimes not); 
they seek to defend their processes of inference against the effects of dissimulation; 
some enjoy privileged powers denied to others. There is an increasingly strongly 
policed, but still vaguely defined, boundary between legitimate strategic action and 
illegal spoofing. As the boundary hardens, so the nature of strategic algorithmic action 
shifts.3 It is indeed perfectly possible that in the kinds of markets discussed here, 
algorithms now act more strategically than humans can.4 The very fact that human 
passions are raised by algorithmic queuing and spoofing, and that the latter can lead to 
jail, is indirectly testimony to the richness of how algorithms interact: we see in that 
interaction echoes of how we humans interact. As Knorr Cetina commented in response 
                                                             
3 The interviewee who told me about the decline in ‘classic’ forms of spoofing following 
the first criminal indictment also said that they were being replaced by orders that were 
still going to be cancelled, but acted ‘epistemologically’ (by revealing how ‘real’ other 
orders in the order book were) rather than by immediately profitable (but detectable 
and legally problematic) trades. 
4 It is, for example, harder for a human spoofer (who can only act slowly) to hide his or 
her traces, for example, by using multiple small orders with random sizes, rather than a 
single all-to-obvious big order. 
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to a workshop presentation of this paper, the notion of ‘the interaction order of 
algorithms’ has a certain phenomenological adequacy.  
The brief discussion in the section immediately before this conclusion also 
demonstrates, I would argue, the relevance of one of the main reasons Goffman gave for 
‘isolating the interaction order’: that it ‘provides a means and a reason to examine 
diverse societies comparatively, and our own historically’ (Goffman, 1983: 2). Look 
comparatively across asset classes (contrasting, for instance, foreign exchange and 
share trading), or historically examine how trading has changed, and you find in 
algorithmic interaction not just emergent phenomena, generated reflexively and locally, 
but also the traces of wider processes: the efforts to outlaw spoofing and thus keep 
order books ‘pure’; the continuing market power of big banks in foreign exchange; even 
perhaps the decades-long neoliberal project to give competition – that unnatural, 
‘fragile’ thing – a ‘real, historical existence’ (Foucault, 2008: 131-32). 
 Modesty, though, is also required, for by now the reader will surely have noticed 
a methodological irony. This paper has not employed the preferred methodology of 
interactionist sociology, participant observation. Remarkably, given that HFT firms 
protect their intellectual property fiercely (even gaining interview access is in many 
cases impossible), Robert Seyfert of the University of Konstanz and, especially, Ann-
Christina Lange of the Copenhagen Business School have gained a degree of 
observational access to HFT firms (see Borch, Hansen and Lange, 2015). Observing an 
HFT firm, however, is not the same as observing algorithms. Algorithms were 
interacting in Cermak when I visited that datacentre, but were of course invisible to me. 
To be dependent, in consequence, on the testimony (or even to observe the actions) of 
the human beings who write and use trading algorithms is to rely upon indirect 
evidence that can mislead. As one of my HFT interviewees warned me: ‘someone could 
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be in all honesty saying they’re [their algorithms are] doing [something] when in fact 
they’re doing something else, they’re just not measuring it right’. 
 The interaction of algorithms does leave its traces in changes in order books and 
in prices. However, in the order-book and price data available to academic researchers, 
trading-account identifiers are almost always removed, making it difficult or impossible 
to identify sequences of actions by the same algorithm or even the same trading firm. 
Researchers employed by regulatory bodies do have access to account identifiers, but 
they have found the task of unravelling patterns of algorithmic interaction (even in 
short time periods) computationally, and perhaps conceptually, close to intractable. Six 
years on, there is still debate on the causes of the ‘flash crash’, a twenty-minute spasm in 
the US futures and stock markets on 6 May 2010. A working party from five regulatory 
bodies spent months seeking to disentangle a broadly similar event in the US Treasury 
bond market between 9:33 a.m. and 9:45 a.m. on 15 October 2014, but confessed 
themselves unable fully to identify ‘[t]he dynamics that drove … trading’ in those twelve 
minutes (Joint Staff Report, 2015: 33). Furthermore, any Goffmanian wants to see 
analyses of routine, not just unusual, interaction, but researchers employed by market 
regulators understandably often need to focus on the unusual.  
 We are, in short, still far from having a robust understanding of how trading 
algorithms interact. However, the virtue of the concept of ‘interaction order’ is that it 
focuses our attention on the right issue, which is indeed interaction. Any individual 
trading algorithm can perfectly reasonably be seen as the ‘delegate’ of a human being or 
beings (although my interviewee’s warning of their possibly defective understanding of 
its operations must be borne in mind). But the ensemble of interacting algorithms is not 
our individual or collective delegate, and while the program text of a trading algorithm 
may usually remain unchanged by interaction, how it materially acts is shaped by 
interaction. Even individual algorithms thus need to be understood relationally, in the 
 24 
spirit of Goffman’s unfortunately worded but succinct summary of his relational 
sociology: ‘Not, then, men and their moments. Rather moments and their men’ 
(Goffman, 1967: 3).  
 
Appendix 1: Empirical Nuances 
There are two other main ways (beyond the entry and cancellation of orders) in which 
trading algorithms interact. The first is in electronic trading venues that, unlike those 
discussed in the text, do not have central order books. For example, some venues 
(especially in bond trading and foreign exchange) have instead a fixed distinction 
between participants, generally algorithmic, that are allowed to post bids and offers – 
either in response to requests to do so, or in the form of constantly ‘streamed’ prices – 
and other participants, generally human beings, that cannot post prices but can only 
accept prices posted by others. Second, even although the different algorithms being run 
by a trading firm do not (as far as I can tell) usually collaborate, they can have effects on 
each other. Firms normally have aggregate risk limits that mean, e.g., that if one 
algorithm has built up a large position in a particular stock, others are prevented from 
adding to it. Also common is software to prevent self-trading (an algorithm selling 
financial instruments to another of the firm’s algorithms), which incurs unnecessary 
expenses and may attract unwelcome regulatory attention as potentially setting a ‘false 
price’. This software has the effect, e.g., that if one algorithm is offering shares at a given 
price, then (dependent on the software’s settings) either all of the firm’s other 
algorithms are prevented from bidding to buy shares at that price or the original offer is 
cancelled (in effect by an algorithm other than the one that submitted it).  
 Local interactions of this kind among algorithms are of theoretical interest, for 
example if one wishes to apply metaphors such as ‘swarming’. Also interesting in this 
respect is that algorithms can sometimes learn ‘locally’ about order-book changes via a 
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‘confirm’ – an electronic message reporting execution of one of a firm’s orders – before 
the corresponding message appears in the overall datafeed.  
The discussion of orders in the text is also not exhaustive. As well as the orders 
described (which market participants would call ‘limit orders’, i.e. orders to buy at or 
below a specified price, or orders to sell at or above it), it is, for instance, also often 
possible for an algorithm or human trader to submit a ‘market order’. This is an order 
simply to buy or to sell at the best available price, and it can therefore under almost all 
circumstances be executed immediately. The order book thus contains only limit orders, 
not market orders, which is why the fuller name for it is ‘central limit-order book’.  
While most matching engines operate a time-priority system of the kind 
described in the text, a minority employ ‘pro-rata’ matching, in which new executable 
orders are matched against existing orders in proportion to the size of the latter. Certain 
‘designated market makers’ (for example in options) may also be guaranteed a specific 
proportion of any incoming executable order. 
 
Appendix 2: Intermarket Sweep Orders and Special Order Types 
Regulation NMS in effect decrees that before an exchange’s matching engine adds a 
displayable order to its order book it must check the best (i.e. highest priced) bid and 
best (i.e. lowest priced) offer available at all other US exchanges. A matching engine 
cannot, for example, add to its order book an offer to sell at the price of the national best 
bid, but must electronically route that order for execution to the exchange whose book 
contains that bid. In consequence, incoming orders for shares are often delayed while 
the matching engine performs this check and waits for it to be permissible to add them 
to the order book.  
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 Regulation NMS thus directly shapes queuing, and has given rise to a variety of 
ways in which algorithms can improve their queue positions. The most important and 
most prevalent is an exception in Regulation NMS (Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2005: 37523) that provides for an ‘Intermarket Sweep Order’. This is an 
order bearing a computerised flag indicating that other orders have been sent to other 
exchanges that will execute against, and thus remove from their order books, any orders 
that block the addition of the flagged order to the order book. However, only registered 
broker-dealers and customers authorised by them are allowed to use the Intermarket 
Sweep Order flag.  
Exchanges have themselves also designed new types of specialised orders, 
which often hinge on the fact that Regulation NMS governs the entry of displayable 
orders, not hidden orders. Matching engines always allocate hidden orders positions in 
the order-book queue behind displayable orders at the same price, but if those 
displayable orders cannot be added to the order book because of the constraints of 
Regulation NMS, an initially hidden order can still get to the head of the queue. Best 
known of these new orders is one made available by the exchange Direct Edge called 
‘Hide Not Slide’ (Anon, 2009).  
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